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Abstract
This paper uses a sequence of government budget constraints to
motivate estimates of returns on the U.S. Federal government debt.
Our estimates di®er conceptually and quantitatively from the interest
payments reported by the U.S. government. We use our estimates to
account for contributions to the evolution of the debt-GDP ratio made
by in°ation, growth, and nominal returns paid on debts of di®erent
maturities.
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1This paper shows contributions that nominal returns, the maturity com-
position of the debt, in°ation, and growth in real GDP have made to the
evolution of the U.S. debt-GDP ratio since World War II. Among the ques-
tions we answer are these. Did the U.S. in°ate away much of the debt by
using in°ation to pay negative real rates of return? Occasionally, but not
usually. Did high net-of-interest de¯cits propel the debt-GDP ratio upward?
Considerably during World War II, but not too much after that. How much
did growth in GDP contribute to holding down the debt-GDP ratio? A lot.
How much did variations in returns across maturities a®ect the evolution of
the debt-GDP ratio? At times substantially, but on average not much since
the end of World War II.
Of necessity, our answers to these questions rely on our own estimates
of returns on government debt, not the series for interest payments reported
by the U.S. government.1 The government budget constraint determines the
evolution of the ratio of government debt to GDP. We propose an accounting
scheme that emerges from a decomposition of the government's period-by-
period budget constraint, to be described and justi¯ed in section I. We
use prices of indexed and nominal debt of each maturity to construct one-
period holding period returns on government IOU's of various maturities.
Multiplying the vector of returns by the vector of quantities outstanding
each period provides the measure of returns that appear in the government
budget constraint.
The U.S. government's interest payments series was not designed to mea-
sure the returns that appear in the government budget constraint. Instead,
the government's series isolates the government's out-of-pocket period-by-
period cash dispersals used to service its debt.2 The government's interest
1Earlier researchers have also noticed the discrepancy between the concept underlying
the government series on interest payments and the concept that appears in the government
budget constraint. See Olivier Jean Blanchard and Je®rey Sachs (1981), Michael Boskin
(1982), Rudolph Penner (1982), Robert Eisner and Paul Pieper (1984), Congressional
Budget O±ce (1985), and Henning Bohn (1992).
2The government ¯gures reported by the Treasury and recorded in the National Income
2payments series answers the question \how many dollars must the Treasury
devote to paying coupons on this period's outstanding Treasury notes and
bonds while rolling over the nominal stock of Treasury bills?"3
The following observation indicates the essential di®erence in the ques-
tions being answered by the government's accounting system and ours.4
Through a suitable debt-management policy, the Treasury could drive the
government's measure of interest payments to zero every period, even though
from the point of view of the government budget constraint, it truly could be
paying substantial interest that would propel the government debt-GDP ra-
tio upward. The government could set o±cially measured interest payments
to zero, for example, by issuing only zero-coupon 10 year bonds and perpet-
ually rolling them over each year. These bonds would never pay coupons.
They would never mature because each year they would be repurchased as
nine year zero-coupon bonds and be replaced by newly issued 10 year zero-
coupon bonds. Of course, although the government's accounts would put
interest payments at zero, in truth the government would still pay interest in
the form of the capital gains earned by the sellers of zero-coupon nine year
bonds (i.e. in the sense determined by its budget constraint).
I Interest payments in the government bud-
get constraint
Let Yt be real GDP at t, and let Bt be the real value of IOU's from the gov-
ernment to the public. That least controversial equation of macroeconomics,
and Product Accounts are prepared by the Bureau of the Public Debt.
3As we document in Appendix A, the government's concept leaves out capital gains and
losses on Treasury notes and bonds, a feature that is revealed by the absence of holding
period returns for longer maturity government obligations in the government's formula for
computing interest payments. Those capital gains and losses appear automatically in the
law of motion for government debt, a.k.a. the government budget constraint.
4We describe the relationship between the government's accounting system and ours
in detail in Appendix A.
3the government budget constraint, accounts for how a nominal interest rate
rt¡1;t, net in°ation ¼t¡1;t, net growth in real GDP gt¡1;t, and the primary














The appropriate concept of a nominal return rt¡1;t is one that veri¯es this
equation.
The nominal return rt¡1;t and the real stock of debt Bt in equation (1) are
averages across terms to maturity. To bring out some of the consequences of
interest rate risk and the maturity structure of the debt for the evolution of
the debt-GDP ratio, we re¯ne equation (1) to recognize that the government
pays di®erent nominal one-period holding period returns on the IOUs of
di®erent maturities that compose Bt. Let ~ B
j
t¡1 and ¹ B
j
t¡1 be the real values
of nominal and in°ation-indexed zero coupon bonds of maturity j at t ¡ 1,








t¡1 are the total real values of
nominal and indexed debt at t ¡ 1; let ~ r
j
t¡1;t be the net nominal holding
period return between t¡1 and t on nominal zero-coupon bonds of maturity
j; let ¹ r
j
t¡1;t be the net real holding period return between t ¡ 1 and t on
in°ation indexed zero coupon bonds of maturity j.5 Then the government
budget constraint expresses the following law of motion for the debt-GDP
ratio:































5In a nonstochastic version of the growth model that is widely used in macroeconomics
and public ¯nance, the net holding period return on debt is identical for zero-coupon bonds
of all maturities (e.g., see Lars Ljungqvist and Thomas J. Sargent, 2011, chapter 11). The
presence of risk and possibly incomplete markets changes that.
4+
~ Bt¡1 + ¹ Bt¡1
Yt¡1
: (2)
Equation (2) distinguishes contributions to the growth of the debt-GDP ratio
that depend on debt maturity j from those that don't. In particular, ¼t¡1;t
and gt¡1;t don't depend on j and operate on the total real value of debt last
period; but the holding-period returns ~ r
j
t¡1;t and ¹ r
j
t¡1;t do depend on maturity
j and operate on the real values of the corresponding maturity j components
~ B
j




At each date t, we compute the number of dollars the government has
promised to pay at each date t + j, j ¸ 1. A coupon bond is a stream
of promised coupons plus an ultimate principal payment. We regard such
a bond as a bundle of zero-coupon bonds of di®erent maturities and price
it by unbundling it into the underlying component zero-coupon bonds, one
for each date at which a coupon or principal is due, valuing each promised
payment separately, then adding up these values. In other words, we strip
the coupons from each bond and price a bond as a weighted sum of zero
coupon bonds of maturities j = 1;2;:::;n.6
We treat nominal bonds and in°ation-indexed bonds separately. For nom-
inal bonds, let st
t+j be the number of time t + j dollars that the government
has at time t promised to deliver. To compute st
t+j from historical data,
we add up all of the dollar principal-plus-coupon payments that the govern-
ment has at time t promised to deliver at date t + j. Because zero-coupon
bond prices were not directly observable until prestripped coupon bonds were
introduced in 1985, we extract the nominal implicit forward rates from gov-
ernment bond price data. We then convert these nominal forward rates on
government debt into prices of claims on future dollars. Let qt
t+j be the
6The market and the government already do this. Prestripped coupon bonds are rou-
tinely traded.






where ½jt is the time t yield to maturity on bonds with j periods to maturity.
The yield curve at time t is a graph of yield to maturity ½jt against maturity
j. Let n be the longest maturity outstanding. The vector fqt
t+jgn
j=1 prices
all nominal zero coupon bonds at t. To convert t dollars to goods we use
vt = 1
pt, where pt is the price level in base year 2005 dollars, and vt is the
value of currency measured in goods per dollar.
For in°ation-protected bonds (TIPS), let ¹ st
t+j be the number of time
t + j goods that the government at t promises to deliver. For indexed debt,
when we add up the principal and coupon payments that the government has
promised to deliver at date t+j as of date t, we adjust for past realizations of
in°ation in ways consistent with the rules governing TIPS. We then compute
¹ qt






(1 + ¹ ½jt)j
where ¹ ½jt is the time t yield to maturity on real bonds with j periods to

















The ¯rst term is the real value of the nominal debt, computed by multiplying
the number of time t+j dollars that the government has sold, st
t+j, by their
price in terms of time t dollars, qt
t+j, summing over all outstanding bonds,
j = 1;:::;n, and then converting from dollars to goods by multiplying by vt.
The second term is the value of the in°ation-protected debt, computed by
multiplying the number of time t+j goods that the government has promised,
¹ st
t+j, by their price in terms of time t goods, ¹ qt
t+j, and then summing over
j = 1;:::;n.
6With deft denoting the government's real net-of-interest budget de¯cit,






























t+j¡1 + deft; (3)
where it is to be understood that qt
t = 1 and ¹ qt
t = vt.
The left hand side of equation (3) is the real value of the interest bearing
debt at the end of period t. The right side of equation (3) is the sum of the
real value of the primary de¯cit and the real value of the outstanding debt
that the government owes at the beginning of the period, which in turn is
simply the real value this period of outstanding promises to deliver future
dollars s
t¡1
t¡1+j and goods ¹ s
t¡1
t¡1+j that the government issued last period.
To attain the government budget constraint in the form of equation (2),





















































































































t¡1;t ¡ gt¡1;t (10)
To implement budget constraint (4), it is important to recognize that
Federal debt has both marketable and nonmarketable components. For the
marketable components, it is straightforward to measure the appropriate
prices, qt
t+j; ¹ qt










, but for the non-
marketable components, implicit returns must somehow be synthesized. In
section B, we describe in detail how we did that.
B Data
Our data are end-of-year observations from 1941 to 2009. As described in the
Web Appendix A, the total outstanding debt held by the public is the sum
of the marketable (i.e Treasury bills, notes, bonds, and TIPS) and nonmar-
ketable (i.e., savings bonds, and special issues to state and local governments)
debt. We obtained prices and quantities of marketable nominal bonds held
by the public from the CRSP Monthly Government Bond File. Since CRSP
only reports the quantity-held data back to 1960, we extended this series
using data from the Treasury Bulletin. The quantities outstanding of the
Treasury in°ation-protected securities (TIPS) are from December issues of
the U.S Treasury's Monthly Statement of the Public Debt. For the pre-1970
period, we ¯t a zero-coupon forward curve from the coupon bond price data
via Daniel Waggoner's (1997) cubic spline method. For 1970 to 2009, we use
the nominal and real zero-coupon yield curves computed by Refet Gurkay-
nak, Brian Sack, and Jonathan Wright (2007, 2010).7
Our analysis focuses solely on Treasury debt. We exclude agency se-
curities (e.g. the Tennessee Valley Authority and government sponsored
7These yield curves are available from http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/researchdata.htm.































← total debt outstanding
marketable debt held by the public →
← marketable+nonmarketable debt held by the public
Figure 1: Marketable Debt held by the Public, Total Debt held by the Public,
and Total Debt Outstanding as Percentages of GDP
The solid line is the ratio of the par value of marketable Treasury securities held by
the public to GDP. The dashed line is ratio of the par value of all Treasury securities
(marketable and nonmarketable) held by the public to GDP. The dot-dashed line is ratio
of the par value of total outstanding debt to GDP.
enterprises) that are implicitly or explicitly guaranteed by the Federal Gov-
ernment, since the revenue streams that back these securities are not included
in the primary de¯cit series of our government budget constraint, equation
(1). Nor do we include in the analysis government assets such as gold reserves
and real estate holdings. Finally, our analysis does not incorporate unfunded
future government liabilities.
While marketable securities today represent the lion's share of the debt
held by the public ($7.2 out of $7.8 trillion, or a little less than 93 percent in
2009), this has not always been the case. In ¯gure 1, we plot the debt-GDP
ratio for three di®erent measures of the debt: 1) the marketable debt held by
9the public; 2) the sum of the marketable and the nonmarketable debt held
by the public; and 3) the total outstanding debt. Over the entire period,
marketable debt has averaged about 80 percent of the total debt held by
the public (i.e., the ratio of the solid line to the dashed line). Early in the
sample, this ratio was about two-thirds, and it has steadily increased over
time. Nonmarketable savings bonds and Victory loans played a much larger
role in Treasury borrowing during World War II and the Korean War than
they do today.
The Federal Government reports its receipts, expenditures, and interest
payments in two places: the annual budget issued by the Treasury and the
NIPA. For two reasons, we use ¯scal data from the NIPA Table 3.2 to com-
pute the primary de¯cit rather than budget data from the Treasury. First,
the Treasury reports data for the ¯scal year, which runs from October to
September, while we measure returns on a calendar year basis. Second,
NIPA interest payments (NIPA Table 3.2, line 28) exclude interest paid to
other government trust funds, such as the Social Security trust fund. Interest
on the public debt reported by the Treasury includes interest paid to these
trust funds. NIPA interest payments include interest paid to the Military
and Civil Service retirement funds. We net out these payments using data
on NIPA Table 3.18B, line 24. We compute output growth rates using real
GDP from the NIPA. For the value of currency, vt, we take the inverse of the
fourth quarter observation of the GDP price de°ator.
The left side of equation (3) is the real value of the interest bearing debt
held by the public at the end of period t. To compute the contribution that
marketable debt makes to this sum, instead of estimating quantities of zero
coupons bonds and their prices as we do (i.e., computing the st
t+j sequences
and estimating a zero-coupon yield curve), we could just multiply the vector
of market prices by the vector of the quantities outstanding for each security.
These alternative calculations yield nearly identical debt series. Of course,
an advantage of our computation that uses estimates of fqt
t+jg and fst
t+jg is
10that we can decompose returns by maturity.
Ipso facto, market prices for the nonmarketable portion of the debt are
unavailable. Therefore, we proceeded as follows. We obtained the par value
of the total nonmarketable debt held by the public from Table OFS-1 of
the Treasury Bulletin and from the Monthly Statement of the Public Debt.
To estimate a market value of the nonmarketable portion of the debt, we
multiplied its par value by the ratio of the market value to the par value of
marketable debt held by the public.8
C Previous work
It is useful to relate our market value of debt and return series to previous
estimates. John Seater (1981), Michael Cox and Eric Hirschhorn (1983),
James Butkiewicz (1983), Eisner and Pieper (1984), Cox (1985), and Bohn
(1992) have calculated series on the market value of the Treasury's portfolio.
Our debt series most closely aligns with Seater's (1981) MVPRIV3 series
(see his Table 1) and Cox and Hirschhorn's (1983) series \Market value of
privately held treasury debt" (see their Table 6).9
Since we compute the returns on the marketable debt directly, our esti-
mates of these returns are not sensitive to how either the primary de¯cit or
the value of the nonmarketable debt is measured. By way of contrast, esti-
mates that some other authors have created are sensitive to how the primary
de¯cit and the value of nonmarketable debt are measured. Eisner and Pieper
(1984), Eisner (1986), and Bohn (1992) computed measures of the govern-
ment's interest payments that are conceptually similar to ours. But instead
of computing the terms on the left side of (3) directly, they used the inter-
temporal budget constraint (1) to compute total returns ~ rt¡1;t ~ Bt¡1 as the
change in the market value of debt minus the primary de¯cit. An advantage
of that alternative approach is that it avoids using data on pricing kernels
8See ¯gure III in Web Appendix A for a graph of this ratio.
9The Cox and Hirschhorn (1983) series has been updated and is available from
http://www.dallasfed.org/data/data/natdebt.tab.htm.
11qt
t+j and promised payments st
t+j. Instead, the market value of the debt can
be computed directly from the observed prices and quantities outstanding of
government bonds.10
However, while in theory the government budget identity (2) should hold
exactly, with measured series this equation carries residuals that have several
sources. Early in the sample, much of the data from the NIPA are reported
to just two (and in some cases just one!) signi¯cant digits. While we have
tried to minimize discrepancies, there are still small di®erences between the
NIPA ¯scal data and the Treasury's accounting.11 Further, the change in the
market value of the debt is sensitive to the de¯nition of the debt (e.g. should
the monetary base be included or not?, How should debt from government
corporations and agencies or government assets such as gold be treated?).
The computed return series will be a weighted average of returns on the
securities included. Further, the primary de¯cit series should be consistent
with the choice of securities. Discrepancies between the debt and de¯cit
series will corrupt any measure of returns computed as a residual.12
We prefer our calculations because they avoid some (but not all) of these
measurement error issues. Furthermore, our calculations also allow us (a) to
account for holding-period returns on obligations of di®erent maturities and
thereby form the decompositions of interest payments in table 2 and ¯gure
4, (b) to execute counterfactual debt management experiments, and (c) to
dissect the di®erence between our estimates of the interest costs and those
reported by the Treasury. We turn to this last task in Appendix A.
10We will employ a similar strategy in section II as one of two ways to estimate the
returns on the nonmarketable portion of the debt.
11For example, NIPA interest payments include interest paid by the IRS on certain tax
refunds.
12Nevertheless, the two approaches lead to similar results quantitatively. For the period
in which our study overlaps with Bohn's (1948 to 1989), his return series and ours move
together, although ours is more volatile, particularly during the 1980s; the mean and
standard deviation of our value-weighted return series is 1.64 and 4.28, compared with
2.42 and 3.19, respectively, for Bohn's return series. The correlation coe±cient between
his return series and ours is 0.76.
12II Contributions to the evolution of the U.S.
debt-GDP ratio
To set the stage for the role that interest rate risks will play in our story, ¯g-
ure 2 shows the evolution of the government's promised nominal marketable
payments st
t+j over time and across maturities measured in years. Through-
out the post-war period, the largest share of the promised payments are due
within one year. The size of these promised payments diminish quickly as
the term to maturity increases. During the 1940s, long term debt made up
a large share of government borrowing. The share of long-term obligations
steadily declined over the 1950s and 1960s. By the 1970s the government
had very few promised payments more than 15 years out. Finally, note the
sharp increase in debt due within one year in 2009.
Figure 3 displays the one-period holding period returns by maturity over
time. During the ¯rst half of the sample, the returns are relatively °at across
maturities and stable across years. During the later part of the sample, post-
1980, the returns become considerable more volatile across maturities and
years.13
Figure 4 shows contributions to the propulsion of ( ~ B + ¹ B)=Y in formula






Yt¡1 for various maturities j. The
¯gure shows that volatility of nominal interest rate payments has been larger
for longer horizons. For the period 1942-2009, ¯gure 5 plots the mean and
standard deviation of one-year real holding-period returns by maturity for the
nominal, marketable portion of the debt.14 Figure 5 reveals that while longer
maturities have generally been associated with higher and more volatile re-
turns, returns on bonds maturing in 15, 20, and 30 years were on average
lower than those for adjacent maturities. We suspect that this outcome
13See Web Appendix C for simple calculations that provide intuition behind the large
capital gains and losses on pure discount bonds.
14A principal aim of stochastic discount factor models like the one proposed by Monica
Piazzesi and Martin Schneider (2006) is to capture how means and standard deviations of




























Figure 2: Promised Nominal Marketable Payments, st
t+j, by Date and Ma-
turity.
partly, but not entirely, re°ects investors' preferences for newly issued or
so-called `on the run' securities.
Figure 6 plots the average maturity, in years, of the marketable Treasury
debt held by the public along with the ratios of the marketable and total
debt held by the public to GDP from 1941 to 2009. The average maturity
moves with the debt-GDP ratio. Immediately after World War II, the average
maturity of the government's marketable portfolio was approximately 7 years.
As can be anticipated from the time path of promised payments in ¯gure 2,
over the next three decades, it fell steadily, reaching a trough in the mid-
1970s at around 2 years. During the 1960s and early 1970s, this fall was partly
the consequence of federal legislation, repealed in 1975, that had prevented
the Treasury from issuing securities paying interest above 4.25 percent { a
threshold that was below long-term market rates during that period. As we
































Figure 3: One Period Holding Period Returns for Marketable Debt
during the high in°ation years of the 1970s, this law prevented the Treasury
from fully bene¯ting from the negative implicit real interest it managed to
pay through in°ation. Since the repeal of this restriction, the Treasury has
lengthened the average maturity to between 3 and 4 years.
In 1941 the ratio of the market value of the total debt held by the public
to GDP was 37.0 percent. By 1945 this ratio had risen to 97.2 percent. It
fell steadily over the next three decades, reaching a trough in 1974 at 16.9
percent. After the de¯cits of the 1980s, it peaked again in 1993 at 48.2
percent. It fell below 30 percent during the Clinton administration, but by
December 2009 it had climbed back to 48.8 percent.
What contributions did in°ation, growth, and compound interest make
to the evolution of the debt-GDP ratio depicted in ¯gure 6? To answer this
question, we take
~ Bt¡¿+ ¹ Bt¡¿
Yt¡¿ as an initial condition at time t ¡ ¿ and iterate










































Figure 4: Decomposition of the Nominal Payouts by Maturity of Obligation

















































































Figure 5: Mean and Standard Deviation of Real Holding Period Returns by
Maturity


































← average maturity of marketable debt
marketable debt held by the public →
← marketable+nonmarketable debt held by the public





































Figure 6: Ratio of Marketable and Total Debt held by the Public to GDP
and Average Maturity of the Marketable Debt held by the Public
on (2) to arrive at the following useful decomposition:
~ Bt + ¹ Bt
Yt
¡





























Before describing the results of applying decomposition (11), we brie°y
describe how we addressed issues associated with the presence of nonmar-
ketable government debt within ~ Bt + ¹ Bt. To compute the return on the
nonmarketable portion of the debt, we use two alternative methods summa-
rized in table 1. Unlike for the marketable portion of the debt, we do not
have security-level data for the nonmarketable debt, so we cannot construct
nonmarketable counterparts to the st
t+j series. Thus the returns we compute















Figure 7: Cumulative Sum of the Components of the Change in the Ratio of
Marketable Debt to GDP.
19are average returns for the entire stock of nonmarketable debt. Under the
heading \Nominal Return I" (column 10), we report the average return on
the entire stock of nonmarketable debt that makes equation (2) hold with
equality. Under the heading \Nominal Return II" (column 11), we report the
return computed by assuming that the average return on the nonmarketable
portion of the debt is the same as the average return on the marketable
portion of the debt. When using the column (11) method, equation (2) will
not necessarily hold with equality. In column (12), we report the size of the
residual in equation (2) left under this column (11) way of computing the
return. Contributions from the marketable debt and the primary de¯cit are
computed independently from the nonmarketable debt and so are una®ected
by any assumptions made about the nonmarketable debt. Reassuringly, the
two methods deliver similar contributions for four of the six subperiods. The
two subperiods in which the two contributions diverge (1981-1993 and 1993-
2001) were periods in which long term bond-holders did particularly well. If
the maturity structure across the marketable and nonmarketable debt di®ers
substantially, the column (11) way of computing the return will be biased
during periods in which the slope of the yield curve is changing dramatically.
Tables 1 and 2 report elements of a decomposition based on equation
(11).15 In particular, for various values of t and ¿, table 1 reports decom-
positions of the debt-GDP increments
~ Bt+ ¹ Bt
Yt ¡
~ Bt¡¿+ ¹ Bt¡¿
Yt¡¿ by components at-
tributable to (i) nominal interest payments, (ii) in°ation, (iii) GDP growth,
and (iv) the primary de¯cit for both the marketable and the nonmarketable
portions of the debt. Table 2 then decomposes the nominal interest pay-
ments, in°ation, and GDP growth components for the marketable debt by
maturity.
Figure 8 plots the in°ation rate, the growth rate of real GDP, and the
value weighted return on the government's debt portfolio. For the ¯rst half
of the sample, the growth rate of GDP exceeded the return on the debt,
15We report plots of these decomposed series in Web Appendix B.
201941- 1945- 1974- 1981- 1993- 2001- 1941- 1945-
Period 1945 1974 1981 1993 2001 2009 2009 2009
Debt/GDP
end 97.2 16.9 19.9 48.2 28.5 48.8 48.8 48.8
start 37.0 97.2 16.9 19.9 48.2 28.5 37.0 97.2
change 60.2 -80.3 3.0 28.3 -19.7 20.3 11.8 -48.4
Marketable Debt
Nominal Return 3.6 21.8 7.5 36.5 17.7 8.9 96.0 92.4
In°ation -7.3 -35.0 -8.1 -11.6 -5.2 -5.0 -72.4 -65.0
Real Return -3.5 -11.6 -0.6 24.1 12.2 3.8 24.4 27.9
GDP Growth -15.6 -21.3 -3.3 -10.9 -10.7 -3.3 -65.1 -49.5
Nonmarketable Debt
Nominal Return I -0.8 11.0 4.9 1.1 -3.1 0.4 13.4 14.2
Nominal Return II 1.7 9.1 2.5 6.4 2.5 1.6 23.7 22.0
Di®erence -2.5 1.9 2.4 -5.3 -5.6 -1.2 -10.3 -7.8
In°ation -2.4 -15.2 -2.9 -1.9 -0.7 -0.8 -23.9 -21.5
Real Return -3.2 -4.2 2.0 -0.8 -3.8 -0.4 -10.9 -7.3
GDP Growth -4.9 -10.5 -1.1 -1.7 -1.5 -0.6 -20.2 -15.3
De¯cit/GDP 84.7 -34.7 5.8 17.8 -15.9 20.8 78.5 -6.2
Table 1: Contributions to Changes in the Debt-GDP Ratio
Marketable debt include both the marketable nominal bonds and the TIPS.
Nominal Return I is the return component of the nonmarketable debt computed as a
residual to equation (2).
Nominal Return II is the return component of the nonmarketable debt assuming the return
on the nonmarketable debt is equal to the return on the marketable debt.
211941- 1945- 1974- 1981- 1993- 2001- 1941- 1945-
Period 1945 1974 1981 1993 2001 2009 2009 2009
Debt/GDP
end 97.2 16.9 19.9 48.2 28.5 48.8 48.8 48.8
start 37.0 97.2 16.9 19.9 48.2 28.5 37.0 97.2
change 60.2 -80.3 3.0 28.3 -19.7 20.3 11.8 -48.4
Marketable Debt
Nominal Returns
Nominal Bonds 3.6 21.8 7.5 36.5 17.6 8.5 95.5 91.9
j · 1 0.7 10.1 5.0 11.7 5.9 2.0 34.4 34.7
2 · j · 4 0.6 6.1 2.3 12.4 6.0 2.4 29.8 29.3
j ¸ 5 2.3 5.5 0.2 12.5 5.7 4.1 30.2 27.9
TIPS 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.5
In°ation
Nominal Bonds -7.3 -35.0 -8.1 -11.6 -5.2 -5.0 -72.4 -65.0
j · 1 -1.3 -11.4 -4.4 -4.9 -2.0 -2.0 -26.4 -24.7
2 · j · 4 -4.4 -7.4 -2.6 -4.0 -1.8 -1.6 -18.7 -17.4
j ¸ 5 3.6 -16.2 -1.1 -2.7 -1.4 -1.5 -27.3 -22.9
GDP Growth
Nominal Bonds -15.6 -21.3 -3.3 -10.9 -10.6 -3.2 -64.9 -49.3
j · 1 -3.3 -8.6 -1.8 -4.6 -4.0 -1.2 -23.4 -20.2
2 · j · 4 -2.7 -6.5 -1.0 -3.8 -3.8 -1.1 -18.8 -16.2
j ¸ 5 -9.7 0.9 -0.4 -2.6 -2.9 -1.0 -22.6 -12.9
TIPS -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2
Nonmarketable Debt -8.0 -14.7 -0.6 -2.4 -5.4 -1.0 -30.6 -22.6
De¯cit/GDP 84.7 -34.7 5.8 17.8 -15.9 20.8 78.5 -6.2
Table 2: Contributions to Changes in the Debt-GDP Ratio Decomposed by
Maturity of Marketable Debt
The nominal bonds are decomposed into three groups: bonds maturing within one year,
j · 1; bonds maturing between two and four years, 2 · j · 4; bonds maturing in ¯ve
years or more, j ¸ 5.















Figure 8: Return on Government Debt, In°ation, and GDP Growth Rate
The solid line is the growth rate in real GDP, the dot-dashed lined is the in°ation rate,
and the dashed line is the value-weighted nominal return on the government's portfolio of
debt.
23while in the second half of the sample, the return on the government debt
exceeded the growth rate.
Tables 1 and 2 and ¯gures 7, and 8 reveal the following patterns in the
way that the U.S. grew, in°ated, and paid its way toward higher or lower
debt-GDP ratios:
1. From 1945 to 1974, the debt-GDP ratio fell from 97.2 to 16.9. Of this
80.3 percentage drop,
(a) 15.8 was due to negative real returns on both the marketable and
nonmarketable debt via in°ation (table 1). For the marketable
portion of the debt, we see in table 2 this largely (approximately
10.7 out 11.6) hit the long-term bond holders.16;17 The average
maturity of the debt was around 7 years immediately after WWII.
(b) 31.8 was due to growth in real GDP.
(c) 34.7 was due to running primary surpluses.
2. During the 1970s, the U.S. continued to in°ate away part of the debt,
but the magnitudes were small.
(a) Long term bond holders received negative real returns, but since
there was not much debt outstanding (B=Y was less than :2) and
the average maturity of the debt was low (around 2 years), the
government was unable to nail the long-term bond holders as it
had done immediately after WWII.
16To compute the real return contribution on the long term (5+) bonds, the real return
is approximately equal to the nominal return component minus the in°ation component
or 5:5 ¡ 16:2 = 10:7.
17Between 1946 and 1955, in°ation pushed the price level up by 37.8 percent. Joshua
Aizeman and Nancy Marion (2009) divide the initial debt-GDP ratio by 1.378 to estimate
the reduction in the debt-GDP ratio contributed by in°ation from 1946-55. During that
period, from equation (11) we compute a smaller role for in°ation, about 23 percent.
24(b) B=Y continued to grow during the 1970s in spite of the govern-
ment in°ating away part of the debt. The causes were insu±-
ciently rapid real GDP growth and primary de¯cits.
3. During the Reagan-H.W. Bush years (1981-1993), the debt-GDP ratio
grew from 19.9 in 1981 to 48.2 in 1993 { an increase of 28.3 percent.
(a) Over half of this increase (17.8) came from primary de¯cits.
(b) Despite strong GDP growth, B=Y grew by more than the primary
de¯cits due to large real returns paid to bond holders. Returns
to long-term bond holders account for 9.8 (12.5-2.7) of the 28.3
increase. Thus, while long-term bondholders were heavily taxed
by in°ation after WWII, they did very well when Volcker brought
in°ation down during the early 1980s.
4. The reduction in B=Y that occurred during the Clinton years (1993-
2000) was largely driven by primary surpluses. Real returns to bond
holders approximately o®set the contribution from GDP growth.
5. During the George W. Bush and Barack Obama years (2001-2009),
primary de¯cits largely fueled growth in B=Y . As in the previous
decade, real returns to bond holders approximately o®set GDP growth.
Over the entire post-war period from 1945 to 2009, the debt-GDP ratio
fell from 97.2 percent to 48.8 percent. During these 64 years, nominal re-
turns to government creditors of marketable debt exceeded in°ation. While
the government has at times in°ated away its debt, on average, holders of
Treasury bills, notes, and bonds were paid positive returns. These returns
pushed up the debt-GDP ratio 27.9 percentage points. The government ran
primary surpluses 32 of these 64 years. By this accounting 1/8 (i.e., 6.2/48.4)
of the drop in indebtedness is due to the government simply paying o® the
debt. But far and away the largest contributor to holding down the debt-
GDP ratio was economic growth.




























Figure 9: One Year Holding Period Real Valued-Weighted Returns of Nom-
inal Debt and In°ation-Protected Debt














































, which are the
value-weighted real one-year holding-period returns on the government's port-
folio of nominal and in°ation-protected debt, respectively. These two series
are quite volatile. The average annual return on the nominal portion of the
debt over the entire time period from 1942 to 2009 was 1.6 percent with a
standard deviation of 4.9 percent.18 Figure 9 reveals three especially striking
outcomes:
1. There were large negative returns immediately after World War II.
2. There were large positive returns in the early 1980s after Volcker brought
down in°ation.19
3. Annual real returns were considerably more volatile in the period be-
tween 1980 and 2006 { a period of low volatility in GDP growth often
described as the Great Moderation.
We see in table 3 that the average growth rate of real GDP exceeds the
sum of the average real return paid to the government's creditors and the
average de¯cit-to-GDP ratio. Finally, it is interesting to note that since the
introduction of TIPS, their returns have on average exceeded those of the
nominal debt. For the TIPS the real return for the period from 1998 to
2009 is 4.8 percent with a standard deviation 7.4. For the nominal portion
of the debt over this ten-year period, the real return was 2.8 percent with a
standard deviation 4.0.
18In Web Appendix C, we report simple calculations to provide some intuition behind
the large capital gains and losses on pure discount bonds.
19It is interesting to compare these outcomes with predictions of Robert Lucas and
Nancy Stokey's (1983) model of tax smoothing, according to which government debt pays
low returns when there are high government expenditure shocks. See Antje Berndt, Hanno
Lustig, and Sevin Yeltekin (2010) for an empirical study and also Hanno Lustig, Christo-
pher Sleet, and Sevin Yeltekin (2008).
27Variable Mean Std Dev
Nominal Return on Nominal Debt 5.36 4.58
Real Return on Nominal Debt 1.63 4.86
In°ation 3.73 2.67
Nominal GDP growth 6.98 3.87
Real GDP growth 3.22 3.47
100£ De¯cit to GDP Ratio 0.15 2.97
Real Return on TIPS (1998-2009) 4.84 7.40
Real Return on Nominal Debt (1998-2009) 2.82 4.01
Table 3: Means and Standard Deviations of Components to debt-GDP Dy-
namics: 1942-2009
III Concluding remarks
The Congressional Budget O±ce estimates that the U.S. debt-GDP ratio will
return to World War II levels by the end of 2011 as a consequence of recent
large primary de¯cits and drops in GDP growth.20 This has reawakened con-
cerns that rising government interest payments could eventually unleash in-
°ation or other painful ¯scal readjustments via `unpleasant monetarist arith-
metic' (Sargent and Neil Wallace (1981)).21 Growing interest payments play
a key role in that unpleasant arithmetic. So to frame the tradeo®s and risks
facing the United States, it is important to account appropriately for the in-
terest that the U.S. government pays to the public and the abundant interest
rate risks that the government shares with its creditors. To account for these
payments and risks and to measure their contributions to the evolution of
the debt-GDP ratio accurately, we advocate computing the real returns on
20See table 1.1 on page 2 of \The Budget and Economic Outlook: An Update," Con-
gressional Budget O±ce, August 2009.
21See for example, Edward Andrews' article in the November 22, 2009 New York Times
\Payback Time: Wave of Debt Payments Facing U.S. Government," and Michael Kinsley's
column in the April 2010 issue of The Atlantic \My In°ation Nightmare: Am I Crazy, or
is the Commentariat Ignoring our Biggest Threat."
28government debts of each maturity.
Finally, we indicate how the government's way of accounting for interest
payments and the quantity of debt might explain a peculiar preference long
expressed by experts who are responsible for designing the term structure of
coupon payments of U.S. Treasury bonds.22 The authorities have sought to
set the coupon rate on a long-term Treasury bond in a way that makes the
initial market value of a bond equal to its par value.23 It is impossible to
understand such a preference by using, for example, the theory of optimal
debt management provided by Lucas and Stokey (1983).
But consider the following imperfect rationalization based on the govern-
ment's reported measure of interest payments and also its practice of reporting
the par value rather than the market value of its debt.24 Recall that when a
coupon bond sells at par, its yield to maturity equals its coupon rate. Assum-
ing an approximately °at term structure of interest rates, if the coupon rate
is set so that the market value is near the par value, then at least initially,
the government's accounting methods do a good job of approximating both
the market value and the interest payments that belong in the government
budget constraint.
22Today, the Treasury leans heavily on the advice of experts from the ¯nancial commu-
nity who are members of the Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee.
23See David Rich Dewey (chapter XIII, 1902) for how an account of how these preferences
played a signi¯cant role in controversies surrounding the design of bonds by the U.S.
Congress during the Civil War. In particular, Dewey discusses the failure of debt issues in
1862 and 1864 due to the Treasury's refusal to sell bonds below their par value. In 1864,
Treasury Secretary Salmon Chase insisted on lowering the government's interest payments
by issuing 5 percent coupon bonds (i.e., the ten-forties) in the place of 6 percent coupon
bonds (i.e., the ¯ve-twenties). By insisting that these new bonds be sold at par despite
current market interest rates that could not support that price, the initial issue of the
ten-forties was (in Dewey's words) \a disaster."
24See the discussion of ¯gure II in Web Appendix A.
29A Reconciling our estimates with the govern-
ment's
As documented earlier by George Hall and Sargent (1997), our estimates
of the interest paid on U.S. government debt di®er substantially from those
reported by the government. In this appendix, we isolate the di®erences
between our way of accounting for interest and the government's. Since they
give di®erent answers, these two accounting systems must be asking di®erent
questions. Our series answers the question \what returns appear in the law
of motion over time of real government indebtedness?"25 What question does
the government's interest payment series answer? And how can we compute




t+j de¯ned in section A?
According to the Code of Federal Regulation26
Interest on bills consists of the di®erence between the discounted
amount paid by the investor at original issue and the par value
we pay to the investor at maturity. Interest on notes and bonds
accrues from the dated date. Interest is payable on a semian-
nual basis on the interest payment dates speci¯ed in the auction
announcement through the maturity date. If any principal or in-
terest payment date is a Saturday, Sunday, or other day on which
the Federal Reserve System is not open for business, we will make
the payment (without additional interest) on the next business
day.
25The law of motion of real government indebtedness is also known as the government
budget constraint.
26U.S. Government Printing O±ce, Code of Federal Regulations, Volume 2, Title
31 { Money and Finance: Treasury, Chapter II { Fiscal Service, Department of the
Treasury, Part 356 Sale and Issue of Marketable Book-Entry Treasury Bills, Notes
and Bonds , Subpart D { Miscellaneous Provisions, Section 356.30, Revised July 1,
2009. See http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/cfr 2009/julqtr/pdf/31cfr356.30.pdf
See Appendix B of Part 356 of the Code of Federal Regulations for mathematical examples
of the computation of interest on Treasury bonds and notes.
30Thus, the government computes interest expenses by adding next year's
coupon payments on Treasury notes and bonds to the product of the stock of
Treasury bills and the associated one-period holding-period return on those
bills. To cast the government's computations in terms of our notation, it is




t (tb) + s
t¡1





t (tb) represents the par value of one-period pure discount Treasury bills,
s
t¡1
t (p) denotes the contribution to s
t¡1
t coming from principal due on longer
term notes and bonds that mature at t, and s
t¡1
t (c) represents coupon pay-
ments on notes and bonds accruing at time t.
The government reports the following object as its nominal interest pay-
ments at time t:
s
t¡1















t (c) in the ¯rst expression is the nominal value of the coupon




t (c) is the nominal value of coupon








t (tb) is the government's
estimate of the nominal payments on Treasury bills. Thus, the government's
estimate answers the following accounting question: \How many dollars must
the government come up with this period to pay the coupons due on its
debt while rolling over its stock of Treasury bills?" It is worthwhile to have
an answer to this interesting question, but it is not the question that our
alternative concept of returns seeks to answer.
In ¯gure 10, we plot the government's o±cial interest payments series and
our concept (12). Since the government's series includes interest payments
on both the marketable and nonmarketable debt held by the public, while
our data covers just the marketable debt held by the public, we divide our
concept by the outstanding value of the marketable debt held by the public.
The two series track each other quite closely: the correlation coe±cient for
the two series is 0.99.
In Figure 11, we contrast the Federal Government o±cial interest payment
series with our interest payment series using annual end of the year data




























Figure 10: Replicating the Government's Reported Interest Payments
The dashed line in the o±cially reported interest costs divided by the outstanding value of
the total debt held by the public. The solid line is equation (12) divided by the outstanding
value of the marketable debt held by the public.





















Figure 11: A Comparison of the Government's Reported Interest Payments
and Our Estimates of Interest Payments
The dot-dashed line is our computed value weighted return on the marketable debt. The
dashed line is the government's reported interest payments divided by the total debt held
by the public. The solid line is the dashed line minus the in°ation rate.
33Variable Mean Std Dev
O±cial Interest/Debt 5.20 2.54
In°ation 3.73 2.67
O±cial Interest/Debt - In°ation 1.47 3.31
Real Return on Nominal Debt 1.63 4.86
Table 4: Means and Standard Deviations of Percent Returns: 1942-2009
from 1941 to 2009. In this graph, we report both our measure of interest
paid (dashed-dotted line) and the government's reported interest payments
(dashed line) as percentages of the market value of debt. As can be seen
in this ¯gure, our series is lower on average and considerably more volatile
than the government's. As we report in table 4 the o±cial interest payments
average 5.20 percent of the debt while our measure of the real return on
the debt averages 1.47. We then subtract the in°ation rate from o±cially
reported interest payments (solid line). The two series have roughly the
same mean (1.47 versus 1.63). Until the 1980s, it appears that much of the
di®erence between the reported series and our series was due to in°ation.27
Post-1980 something else was going on, namely, nominal interest rate risk
that, in a lower and less volatile in°ation environment, translated into real
interest rate risk.
A Pinpointing discrepancies between the government's
interest payments estimates and ours















27Whether or not the two series resemble each other after adjusting for in°ation depends
partly on debt-management policy. For example, as mentioned in the introduction, there
exist debt management policies that can set the government's interest payment series
always to be identically zero.
34isolates the sources of the discrepancies between the government's way of
accounting for interest payments and ours. This expression reveals the fol-
lowing di®erences between the two accounting systems:
1. The term in braces is total coupon payments. But coupon payments
should not be viewed purely as interest payments because they are
partly principal repayments, partly interest payments. Our accounting
method takes that into account, but the government's does not.
2. The term ~ r1
t¡1;ts
t¡1
t (tb) correctly measures a part of government interest
payments according to our budget-constraint-driven de¯nition (1) or
(2), namely, the capital gains or losses that the government pays on its
one-period zero coupon bonds; but :::
3. Expression (13) evidently omits the capital gains or losses that the gov-
ernment pays on its zero coupon bonds of maturities longer than one-





coupon payments for maturities j exceeding 1 do not appear in (13)
but they do in (2).
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